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 Abstract 
We aim to investigate the role of insurance in business recovery following the devastating 
Christchurch earthquake in February, 22nd, 2011. We analyze data from two business surveys 
conducted after the earthquake to examine how insurance affected business operation in the 
aftermath of the earthquake both in the short-term and longer-term. For the short-term analysis, 
we use a combination of propensity score matching (PSM) and linear probability model (LPM) to 
analyze the data. We first estimate the propensity scores for insurance take-up of each firm 
conditional on the firm’s individual characteristics. Stratification based on the estimated 
propensity scores is used to match the treated (insured) and the control (uninsured) firms. We 
then estimate the probability of firms’ continuing operations with a set of control variables to 
account for the level of damage and disruption caused by the quake in each stratum. We find 
little evidence of any beneficial effect of insurance coverage on business continuity in the short-
run. For the longer-term analysis, we analyze the available survey data using logistic regression. 
The result suggests that business interruption insurance significantly promotes increased level of 
long-term productivity for surviving firms following the earthquake. 
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Chapter 1 
Background of the Study 
 
The role of insurance in supporting recovery in the aftermath of a natural disaster is under-
investigated. There are scant literature on how effective is insurance in aiding recovery of 
individuals, businesses, as well as the affected economy as a whole. Understanding how 
insurance aids or fails to aid recovery in the aftermath of a natural disaster is of clear interest 
and globally relevant as the frequency and the magnitude of disasters are both increasing. 
Consequently, our finding should contribute to a more informed and consequently better 
designed insurance policy as a tool to mitigate risks associated with natural catastrophes. The 
objective of this thesis is to investigate the role of insurance in business recovery in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster. We use the Christchurch earthquake in 2011 as a case study. 
 
1.1 The 2011 New Zealand Earthquake 
The Christchurch earthquake on Feb. 22, 2011 was the worst natural disaster in New Zealand’s 
history, with an estimated loss of US$35 billion (Simpson, 2013). The quake hit the Canterbury 
region at 12:51pm, with a magnitude of 6.3 with several big aftershocks in the following 
months.1 It caused 185 fatalities and damaged over 100,000 buildings (McSaveney, 2014). The 
earthquake was actually an aftershock from the September 2010 earthquake. Table 1.1 
presents the top-five worst (in term of magnitude) Christchurch. The first major quake was in 
2010 with the magnitude of 7.1. The second and the third major quakes hit the city of 
Christchurch on Feb. 22, 2011 and caused the most destructive loss in New Zealand’s history. 
After the earthquake in February, about 1,600 commercial buildings in the Central 
Business District (CBD) were marked to be demolished, which is approximately 60% of all the 
buildings in the CBD area (Stevenson et al., 2012a). As the earthquake was followed by over 
3,000 aftershocks, the whole CBD was cordoned off for a prolonged period of time, with the 
                                                          
1 See Christchurch Earthquake Response (2011) for the scientific information regarding the earthquake.  
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last cordoned area made accessible almost two and a half years after the earthquake. This 
restricted access of the CBD caused a sudden negative shock to businesses including businesses 
that did not experience direct damage to their premises or property from the earthquake event 
(Stevenson et al., 2012b). 
 
Table 1.1  Top 5 worst Christchurch earthquakes  
Date&Time Magnitude2 Intensity3 Location 
04 Sep 2010 4:35am 7.1 X 
840 meters from Ansons Rd, Charing 
Cross 7571, New Zealand 
22 Feb 2011 12:51pm 6.34 VIII 
340 meters from Rapaki Rd, 
Hillsborough, Christchurch 8022, New 
Zealand 
22 Feb 2011 2:50pm 5.91 VI 
490 meters from 32 Pentre Terrace, 
Cashmere, Christchurch 8022, New 
Zealand 
13 Jun 2011 2:20pm 6.41 VIII 
690 meters from Barnett Park Track, 
Redcliffs, Christchurch 8081, New 
Zealand 
23 Dec 2011 3:18pm 6 VII 
250 meters from 466-468 Marine 
Parade, South New Brighton, 
Christchurch 8062, New Zealand 
Source: GeoNet (n.d.)    
 
1.2 Impact of the Earthquake on Insurance Industry 
The February quake has an estimated insured loss of US$16.5 billion (MunichRe, 2015). As such, 
it is ranked the sixth most expensive insured event to the insurance industry globally since 1980 
(MunichRe, 2015). The proportion of insured loss is also exceptional for this event, with up to 
70% of damages being insured (figures vary, but all estimates suggest this is the most 
comprehensively insured earthquake in history).4  
                                                          
2 GNS Science (n.d.) defines Magnitude as “Earthquake size is a quantitative measure of the size of the earthquake at its source. 
The Richter Magnitude Scale measures the amount of seismic energy released by an earthquake.”  
3 GNS Science (n.d.) defines Intensity as “The severity of earthquake shaking is assessed using a descriptive scale – the Modified 
Mercalli Intensity Scale.” 
4 Comparatively, the Tohoku tsunami in 2011 has an estimated insured loss of only 19% (MunichRe, 2015). See more detailed 
comparison of the Christchurch earthquake with other catastrophes in Parker and Steenkamp (2012). 
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As the quake originated from an unknown fault line, there was comparatively little 
preparedness for business recovery in the aftermath; and low commercial insurance claims 
ratio for earthquake risk prior to the event (ICNZ, 2014a).5 Consequently, insurance firms had 
no experience in dealing with such a large volume of claims in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquake. Since then, there have been continuing delays in claim settlement (Muir-Wood, 
2012). Three years after the earthquake, between 10-40% of claims have still not been settled 
of which the majority of unsettled claims are commercial claims (ICNZ, 2014b, and 2015)6; in 
contrast with the 2011 earthquake in Japan and the 2010 one in Chile where practically all 
claims have been completely settled in about 2 years (Marsh, 2014). 
 
1.3 Objective of the Thesis 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the role of insurance in business recovery by using 
the 2011 Christchurch earthquake as a case study. We aim to examine the role of insurance in 
both short-term and longer-term contexts.  
For short-term context, we aim to find out how insurance affect business recovery in the 
immediate aftermath. As there were almost no insurance payouts during this period, the 
purpose is to observe if insurance increases the likelihood of business continuity in the 
aftermath as the insured entities are aware of their insurance cover, and can expect to be able 
to fund their recovery through insurance payouts. For longer-term context, we aim to 
investigate the role of insurance in supporting business recovery in terms of organizational 
profitability and productivity. The insurance role here is more direct as in most cases at least 
some of the insurance claim has already been paid.  
The earthquake in Christchurch is useful as a case study for several reasons: (1) 
Insurance cover was widely available and commonly purchased in New Zealand, making it 
                                                          
5 The loss ratio (total loss divided by gross premium) for earthquake risk of private insurers in New Zealand was 5.49% in 2009 
as opposed to 31163% in 2011 (ICNZ, 2014a). 
6 For instance, Deloitte (2015) reported the outstanding insurance claims of Vero Insurance, one of the larger general insurers 
in New Zealand, that “To date, Vero had made $3.8 billion in damage and business continuity claims payments, which 
represents about 80.0% of its total estimated costs. Of this, around 25.0% of claims payments have been made to residential 
policyholders, and the remaining 75.0% to Vero’s commercial clients.” 
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easier to obtain substantial samples of affected and unaffected insureds. (2) The proportion of 
insured damage to total loss of the 2011 earthquake is substantial. This allows us to gather 
sufficient observations of the insureds and uninsureds for the study. (3) Given the existence of a 
public residential insurance scheme (EQC) and a public accident insurance scheme (ACC), 
insurance in New Zealand is very affordable. As such, budget and credit constraints are less 
likely to have been inhibiting factors preventing firms from purchasing insurance. These 
constraints are therefore less likely to constitute a material difference between the insured and 
uninsured, leading to selection bias. (4) The surveys we use in the empirical analysis are 
detailed post-disaster surveys that include both questions about the nature of insurance 
coverage, the impact of the earthquake, and the nature and extent of continued post-disaster 
operations. It is this information that enables us to conduct the empirical study described 
herein. To our knowledge, this is the first research that examines empirically the role of 
insurance in business recovery following a natural disaster. 
 
1.4 Business Survey Data 
In this study, we utilize the data of two business surveys prepared and collected by Resilient 
Organizations, a research organization based in Christchurch. The survey was designed to be a 
longitudinal study of organizational resilience following the earthquake in 2010 (when no one 
predicted there would be a series of even more destructive aftershocks). The questionnaire was 
sent to both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations located in Christchurch Central Business 
District and the affected areas around the Christchurch city.  
The survey questionnaire was primarily designed to measure the impact of the 
earthquakes on infrastructure and assets. It asks firms about the level of damage and the 
disruption experiences following the series of earthquake in Canterbury. There is a section 
devoted to capturing insurance data; and it is this section that enables us to undertake this 
empirical study on the role of insurance in the aftermath of a natural disaster. 
The data collection method of both surveys is similar. Participants were initially 
contacted by phone in order to establish contact with the heads of the organizations. The 
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questionnaire was then sent to their nominated person via physical or electronic address. The 
firms were given options to respond via phone call, online, or mail. Figure 1.1 displays the 
survey timeline along with the date of the earthquakes. Table 1.2 summarizes a brief 
description of each survey.  
 
Figure 1.1  Survey timeline 
 
 
Table 1.2  Survey description 
Description 1Short-term 2Longer-term 
Start Date 31-May-2011 Jul-2013 
Completion Date 18-Sep-2011 Dec-2013 
Participated Firms 309 2176 
Returned Response 176 541 
Response Rate 57% 25% 
Valid Response3 140 461 
Source: 1Kachali (2013), 2Brown et al. (2014), and 3Author’s calculation 
 
The short-term survey was conducted three to six months after the 2011 earthquake. It was 
initially intended for following-up on the recovery process of the 2010 earthquake but was then 
revised to also capture the short-term impact of the 2011 earthquake. For our study, the short-
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term survey is used to capture the role of insurance in supporting immediate post-quake 
recovery. The longer-term survey was completed in 2013. It was designed to follow-up on the 
progress of recovery several years afterwards. We use the longer-term survey to investigate the 
role of insurance in supporting reconstruction and recovery of business operations. 
The questions in the questionnaire mostly require Yes-No answers or Likert (scaled). 
Unfortunately, this includes most of the insurance related questions. We would have preferred 
data on the actual values of premiums and claims classified into property damage and business 
interruption insurance. Nevertheless, given that the published research on the role of disaster 
insurance is scarce, we believe that even the available data provides useful and interesting 
insights. 
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: the next chapter discussed related literature. In particular, 
we discuss the existing studies of the role of insurance in the aftermath of a disaster. Due to the 
use of two surveys with different content, we use two different methods of analyzing data. 
Therefore, the thesis is divided into two parts in chapters 3-8. Part I relates to the short-term 
survey while part II relates to the longer-term one. Chapters 3-5 include a description of the 
methodological framework, data analysis, and the empirical results, respectively, for the short-
term analysis. Chapters 6-8 are devoted to the study of the longer-term and also include the 
methodological framework, the data analysis, and the empirical results, respectively. The final 
chapter provides conclusions and discussions, and elucidates some caveats to this study. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
Insurance is widely recognized as one of the vital mitigation tools against loss and damage from 
natural disasters (UNISDR, 2015). It allows individuals and businesses to transfer all or part of 
their risk exposure to insurance companies in exchange for a certain amount of premium; with 
the purpose of being indemnified should there be any unexpected adverse circumstances. It is 
important as a mitigation tool especially in the case of catastrophic loss when the magnitude of 
loss is large and the affected entities require external financial resources to support their 
recovery.7 
From an insurance perspective, disaster exposure is considered an unknown risk. 
Kunreuther and Pauly (2006) describe it as risk without sufficient statistical data available to 
estimate probabilities of future occurrence accurately. Disaster risk is unknowable for insurance 
business because the accurate prediction of future occurrence is generally impractical. Due to 
the nature of natural disaster risk, the damage caused by disasters could be unexpectedly 
devastating and significantly impact massive number of individuals and businesses as well as 
the economy as a whole. With the potential magnitude of loss that could be destroyed by 
natural disasters, insurance thus could play a critical role in providing funds to support recovery 
in the aftermath of natural disasters. However, the literature on such a role for insurance is 
very limited. What is the extent to which insurance assists or can assist individuals and 
businesses in recovery? 
In reviewing the literature on natural disaster insurance, we focus on the role of 
insurance as a mitigation tool against natural disasters. We begin with the discussion of the cost 
of natural disasters. We further discuss disaster insurance coverage and the role of insurance 
against natural disasters. 
 
                                                          
7 The importance of insurance in dealing with natural disasters is documented in the Economic Report of the President of the 
U.S. for the first time in 2007 (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2010). 
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2.1 Cost of Natural Disasters 
As shown in Figure 2.1, the number of reported natural disasters is increasing with the majority 
of events caused by meteorological (e.g. storm) and hydrological (e.g. flood) disasters. The cost 
of natural disasters is increasing even faster, and, unfortunately, at a higher rate than that of 
the insured losses, see Figure 2.2. A study of 42 countries by Cebr (2012) found that 17 
countries are under-insured; while most of them are developing countries, two of them are 
developed countries. In analyzing underinsurance for specific events, Cebr (2012) found 
significant under-insurance in all major disasters. In most cases, the uninsured portion of losses 
exceeds the insured one. For instance, the Japanese earthquake in 2011 has the proportion of 
underinsurance of 83%. Even in New Zealand, there is also evidence of underinsurance 
following the disastrous event in 2011 (Muir-Wood, 2012; Brown et al., 2013). The 
underinsurance gap is more obvious in the case of commercial insurance (Muir-Wood, 2012; 
Schanz & Wang, 2014; Deloitte, 2015). Moreover, an analysis by Schanz and Wang (2014), 
found that the average insurance gap has broadened during the past 40 years, from 0.02 
percent to 0.13 percent of global GDP.  
Von Peter et al. (2012) find that the uninsured part of disaster loss adversely impacts 
the entire economy. In developed countries, they found that the insured portion of disaster 
losses has no significant impact on the economy following a disaster whereas the uninsured 
part of disaster losses has an adverse impact; the negative impact of the uninsured losses is 
strong even 2-3 years after the disasters.  
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Figure 2.1  Number of natural disasters, 1980-2014 
 
Source: MunichRe (2015) 
 
Figure 2.2  A comparison of overall losses and insured losses, 1980-2014 (in billions US$) 
 
Source: MunichRe (2015) 
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Figure 2.3  The insurance gap and the cost to taxpayer 
 
Source: Cebr (2012). 
 
Cebr (2012) analyzes case studies of natural disasters in five countries: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita 
and Wilma in the United States in 2005; the widespread flooding in the UK in 2007; the 
earthquake in China in 2008; flooding across Thailand in 2011; and the Great  Japan earthquake 
and Tsunami in 2011. Figure 2.3 compares the insurance gap and the cost to taxpayers as a 
percentage of total loss of these five disasters. Except the U.K., other disasters had insurance 
gaps of over 50%. Depending on each specific case, some disasters could be burdensome to 
taxpayers. For instance, China and Japan have a cost to taxpayers of over 100% of total loss; the 
extra cost includes the cost for reduction measures and fiscal stimulus measures. Lashof and 
Stevenson (2013) estimated the cost of disasters in 2012 in the U.S.; it shows that only 25% of 
total disaster loss is insured which, they argue, leaves the remaining cost of US$96 billion to the 
federal governments. This high cost includes the costs of disaster recovery, the costs of 
implementing preventive measures such as wildfire fighting, and the costs of public insurance 
program (flood insurance and crop insurance).  
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2.2 Disaster Insurance: Coverage and Availability 
Disaster insurance is generally available through homeowner insurance for individuals and 
commercial insurance for businesses. However, extreme catastrophic risk could be left 
uninsurable by private insurers (Kleindorfer & Kunreuther, 1999). For instance, flood insurance 
in the U.S. is not available from commercial insurers but is only offered by the government 
(Michel‐Kerjan, E. & C. Kousky, 2010); flood insurance in Netherland is also unavailable through 
private insurance (Botzen & Van Den Bergh, 2008). 
Insurers are not willing to provide coverage for natural disasters for several reasons (e.g. 
Kunreuther, 1996; Jaffee & Russell, 1997; Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009a; Kousky, 2010; 
Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011). One of the reason is that catastrophic risk is an unknowable risk 
making it difficult to estimate future occurrences, thus, actuarially fair-pricing is often 
impractical (Kunreuther & Pauly, 2006). Consequently, the insurers would charge higher 
premium to compensate for the unknown risk of disaster (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009b).  
A survey of actuaries and underwriters by the Wharton Risk Center reported that they 
would charge 25% higher premium to compensate for unknown risks although there is no 
information whether the additional premium assuredly offset the unknown portion of the risk 
(Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009b). As a result, the higher premium rate discourages 
individuals and businesses from buying insurance protection and hence demand for disaster 
insurance is lower. The high cost of protecting future uncertainty may be unattractive as 
compared to the needs of day-to-day expenditures; this is especially true for budget-
constrained individuals (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009c; Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2011; 
OECD, 2013).  
In addition, insurers are reluctant to insure catastrophic risk because it requires them to 
accumulate high loss reserve due to the potential severity of disaster risk (Jaffee & Rusell, 1997; 
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009b). Jaffee and Russel (1997) pointed that there are additional 
costs associated with carrying capital as loss reserve such as tax and accounting expenses, these 
additional costs further discourage insurers from supplying disaster insurance.  
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2010) propose four guiding principles for designing a 
better insurance policy to deal with loss or damage against natural disasters. These four 
12 
 
principles work together to enable private and public sectors as well as insurance sector to 
confront catastrophic risks more effectively.   
The first principle reflects how insurance premium should be determined. Insurance 
premium must reflect the risk that is insured (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2010). Risk-based 
pricing allows insurance companies to collect sufficient capital to deal with the risk that is 
transferred to them. In addition, risk-based premium signals individuals and businesses about 
the severity of the perils that they are facing. It further contributes fair pricing so that those 
high-risk individuals (e.g. live in hazard-prone area) would have to compensate for their risk by 
paying higher premium.  
The second principle examines the affordability of insurance to high-risk individuals. As 
pointed out in Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2010), if insurers fully apply the first guiding 
principle, the risk-based premium for high-risk individuals could be very expensive. This 
extreme cost of protection against natural disasters might become prohibitively expensive or 
unaffordable.  
The third principle is regarding the demand for disaster insurance. Risk-based pricing is 
applicable only if there is sufficient demand for disaster insurance (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 
2010). It is essential to have adequate number of risk pooling in order for disaster insurance to 
be available. High demand for disaster insurance also has the benefit of minimizing the financial 
burden to the government in aiding recovery of both the insured and uninsured.  
The fourth important principle is maintaining the solvency of insurers and reinsurers. 
This principle is a basis that administers financial strengths of (re-)insurers so that they are able 
to handle disaster risk as well as enable them to be capable of meeting their contractual 
obligation, i.e. indemnifying policyholders (Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2010).  
In practice, however, if the actual disaster cost is excessive to the insurers, they would 
adapt by increasing premium rates resulting in lower loss ratios and lower negative impact to 
the insurance companies (Born & Viscusi, 2006). Besides, in surveying homeowners in 
California, Palm (1995) reveals that there was a significant increase in the purchase of 
earthquake insurance after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Therefore, the increasing 
premium rate should not prevent insurers from raising more capital to fund disaster loss. 
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2.3 Role of Insurance against Natural Disasters 
The most notable paper examining the role of insurance in recovery from disasters is the paper 
by Kunreuther (1996), he pointed out that insurance has two main roles in facing natural 
disasters. The first role is that it fundamentally provides indemnification for any loss or damage 
from natural disasters and hence, it relieves the cost to recover physical loss and/or financial 
loss for the affected policyholders. The second role of insurance is to encourage 
implementation of loss prevention program (Kunreuther, 1996). Insurers have a role in 
promoting the application of loss preventive measures by offering incentives such as premium 
reduction to encourage the insured to apply preventive measures (Kunreuther, 1996). In 
addition, insurance also provides price signals regarding the degree of expected risk in different 
locations and by different asset types (Kunreuther, 1996). For instance, UK insurers charge 
flood risk based on risk zones (Field, 2012). However, as in some cases, disaster insurance is 
subsidized through public insurance program, this lower premium might misrepresent the 
actual degree of risk and lower the effort of implementing mitigation tool (Cummins & Mahul, 
2009). 
As pointed by Kunreuther (1996), one way to use insurance to enforce the 
implementation of loss reduction measures is through mortgage condition. The normal practice 
is that insurers co-operate with banks to require mortgagee to purchase insurance to be eligible 
to apply for a loan. This approach ultimately raises the demand for property insurance. After 
that, insurers may provide additional requirements or recommendations for policyholders to 
implement loss reduction mechanisms in exchange for premium discount. For instance, the 
insurer under the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP) offered its policyholders 
premium discount if they applied loss reduction measures against hurricane risk (Warner et al., 
2009). Moreover, a study of homeowner survey by Botzen and Van Den Bergh (2009) in the 
Netherland also found that over 60% of homeowners are willing to implement preventive 
measures in exchange for premium discount. 
In practice, insurance companies do not generally offer lower premium discount than 
the amount required to invest for effective prevention (Doherty et al., 2008). The public sector 
could potentially play a role in supporting insurance industry to enforce these preventive 
14 
 
measures ex ante, by either providing incentives and subsidies, or assisting with monitoring. For 
instance, a state of Connecticut in the U.S. launched Shore Up CT program to offer low-interest-
rate loan program for property owners in coastal zones to finance property modification for 
flood protection and wind-proof structures (Kunreuther, 2015).8 What is not addressed in this 
literature is that how well insurance is performing as a mitigation tool in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster. How does insurance support disaster recovery? In which area or sector is it 
more efficient? To what extent? To our knowledge, these questions have not been answered. 
Analyzing these questions would shed lights on the precise benefits of adopting insurance as a 
means to support reconstruction and/or recovery in the aftermath of a natural disaster, and 
will enable a more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of disaster insurance. 
  
                                                          
8 See http://shoreupct.org/ for more information. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodological Framework 
 
The main objective of the next three chapters is to investigate the role of insurance on business 
recovery following the Christchurch earthquake in 2011 in the short-term. This is the period of 
three to six months after the earthquake. In this period, very few insurance claims have been 
paid (Marsh, 2014); it is most likely that the affected firms relied on other sources of funding to 
finance their recovery, e.g. their organization’s cash flow or the government’s assistance. 
Therefore, the purpose for short-term analysis is to ask whether insured firms are more likely to 
continue their business operations than uninsured firms as they know that damages incurred 
are (potentially) insured and therefore costs would be reimbursed.  
In analyzing the difference between insured and uninsured in surviving natural disasters, 
we use a combination of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Linear Probability Model (LPM) 
to investigate the effect of insurance on recovery. A detailed discussion of each method is 
included in the following sections. 
 
3.1 Propensity Scores Matching (PSM) 
Our aim here is to investigate the role of insurance in business recovery immediately after the 
Christchurch earthquake in 2011. Potentially, the set of firms that have purchased insurance 
might be different than the set of firms that have not. This case is a textbook case of ‘selection 
bias’ when the selection for treatment (to use the terminology common in micro-econometrics) 
is not random and the different characteristics of treatment and non-treatment firms leads to 
misleading statistics when identifying treatment effects. If the selection bias, however, is 
observable (i.e. the different characteristics of treatment and non-treatment firms are 
observable) then there are several ways to overcome this bias. In an ideal case, and with 
enough observations, one could potentially find firms that have exactly the same observable 
characteristics but differed in their decision whether to purchase insurance. The best analogy 
for this is the twins’ studies that are common in, for example, psychological research on the 
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nature/nurture dichotomy. This approach is impossible in this case as it would be extremely 
unusual to have enough observations to allow for this perfect matching.  
A ‘matching’ algorithm was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). When the set of 
pre-treatment observable variables is large, exact matching on the covariates (a ‘twins’ 
method) is impractical. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) introduced matching for the pre-
treatment observations using estimated propensity scores. The propensity score is an index (a 
measure of probability) which describes the probability of receiving treatment. The propensity 
scores for each observed unit are calculated from an estimated limited dependent variable 
model (a probit or logit model) (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).  
The procedure for selecting a set of pre-treatment variables to include in these 
propensity score estimations is important as adding irrelevant variables into the regression 
could potentially increase the selection bias (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). Omitting relevant 
variables would also lead to increase bias (Dehejia & Wahba, 1999). Therefore, only the 
variables that theoretically affect the outcome and the treatment variables should be included 
in the estimation. 
Once every unit has an associated ‘propensity of treatment’ measure, the balancing 
between the treatment and control groups is done in two steps. First, the sample is reduced by 
removing all these observations whose associated propensity scores fall outside the common 
support for the treated and control groups. (those observations that have very high likelihood 
of being treated, and those that have very low likelihood of being treated).  
In the second stage, the literature describes several potential matching algorithms, including 
stratification matching, one-to-one nearest neighbor matching, and radius matching. We start 
our discussion of the evidence with stratification matching, the most common algorithm for 
limited samples. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) demonstrate that stratification based on 
estimated propensity scores will balance 𝑋 covariates if the unconfoundedness and the 
common support/overlap assumptions hold.9 The notations are introduced below: 
 
                                                          
9 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Imbens (2004) for detailed explanations of the identifying assumptions of propensity 
score estimation. 
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Assumption 1 Unconfoundedness: if (𝑌1, 𝑌0) Π  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑋𝑖  then  (𝑌1, 𝑌0) Π  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑃(𝑋𝑖) 
Assumption 2 Overlap: 0 < 𝑃(𝑇𝑖  = 1|𝑋) < 1 
The unconfoundedness assumption states that if the outcomes (𝑌1, 𝑌0) are independent 
(Π denotes independence) of the treatment (𝑇𝑖) given a set of 𝑋covariates, then the outcomes 
(𝑌1, 𝑌0) are independent of the treatment (𝑇𝑖) given propensity scores, 𝑃(𝑋𝑖). If the 
unconfoundedness assumption holds, it also implies that the treatment variable is exogenous 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  
The common support/overlap assumption states that the estimated propensity scores of 
the treated and control units must overlap. This assumption ensures that, at the same 
estimated propensity score, there are sufficient observations in the treatment and control 
group that have identical probability of receiving treatment. If the two assumptions hold, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) refer to this circumstance as ‘strong ignorability’, i.e. “when 
treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given the observed covariates X”. When conditional 
on the estimated propensity scores, we remove the correlation between treatment assignment 
and 𝑋 covariates, i.e. 𝑋𝑖 ⊥  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑃(𝑋𝑖).  
Here, we aim to account for the different characteristics of insured and uninsured firms 
in pre-quake Christchurch. We apply the propensity score estimation as a means to control for 
selection bias. Thus, the propensity score in this study is the probability of insurance adoption 
prior to the earthquake. We firstly estimate the propensity scores model as follows: 
Pr (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖)  =  𝐹(𝑋𝑖
′𝛽)  
Where 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 is a dummy variable that denotes 1 if the firm had insurance at the time of the 
earthquake and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖 is a set of pre-treatment variables listed in Table 5.1. 𝛽 is a 
vector of the estimated coefficients of 𝑋𝑖. 𝐹 is the cumulative distribution function of logistic 
distribution.  
Any limited dependent variable model can be used to estimate propensity scores 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). In this paper, logistic regression is used. Once propensity scores 
are estimated, we identify the common support area which is the region at which the 
propensity scores of the treatment and control groups overlap. After estimating propensity 
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scores, a matching procedure is applied to match the control units and the treated units in the 
common support based on the estimated scores. We match the observations by stratifying the 
sample into quartiles using the propensity scores associated with each observation. 
Stratification based on the estimated propensity scores is preferable for this study because we 
have a relatively small number of observations. Implementing other types of matching would 
reduce the sample further. Besides, it allows us to add other control variables to capture the 
post-quake damage and disruption that are not included in the propensity scores estimation. 
 
3.2 Linear Probability Model (LPM) 
Imbens (2004) proposed that a combination of propensity score matching and regression 
estimation would provide more efficient estimators than propensity score matching alone 
because the propensity score method does not account for the correlation between the 
outcome variables and other control variables.10  
A combination of propensity score matching and regression-based estimation allows us 
to include additional covariates to estimate the average causal effect of insurance adoption on 
the outcome variable. We add a set of control variables that accounts for the damage the firms 
experienced as a result of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. The hypothesis here is that these 
damages have effects on the outcome of interest (i.e. continuation of operation). The model to 
estimate the effect of insurance on short-term business recovery is as follows: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾 𝑍𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the outcome variable denoting 1 if the firm continue its operation after the 
earthquake (not permanently closed) and 0 otherwise. 𝑍𝑖  is a vector of control variables as 
listed in Table 5.2. 𝜏 is the estimated average treatment effect of insurance on the outcome 
variable. 𝛾 is a vector of the estimated coefficients of 𝑍𝑖. 𝑢𝑖  is the error term. After we stratify 
the sample by the observation’s estimated propensity scores, we then estimate the model for 
                                                          
10 The paper by Robins and Ritov (1997) also shows an explicit advantage of combining the two methods. 
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each stratum separately. White’s standard errors are used to correct for heteroscedasticity 
which presents in the model (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
As the predicted estimates are interpreted as conditional probabilities, they must 
essentially lie between 0 and 1. One of the issue of estimating limited dependent model with 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) is that the predicted values could lie outside the boundary of 0 
and 1; there is no priori way to ensure that the estimated values would be strictly within the 
logical boundary (Gujarati, 2003). This is also true as in the case of our study here. While, under 
general circumstances, the logit/probit model would be a solution to guarantee that the 
estimations would be within the boundary; the application of these non-linear models, 
however, requires that there must be variations of samples of the binary choices otherwise the 
prediction would be unsuccessful.11 After stratifying the data based on the estimated 
propensity scores, the observations in each block are assumed to be indifferent in all ways 
except the treatment effect. In other words, the characteristics of firms in each block are 
(almost) identical except the condition whether they had adopted insurance which means that 
there are not sufficient variations of the covariates.  Therefore, logit/probit models are not 
applicable because the estimation procedure will not be successful. This led us to use LPM as 
the estimation model. We are aware that the estimated marginal effects for LPM specifications 
could be biased and inconsistent but the sign of the coefficients will be reliable (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009).12  
The basic premise we would like to examine is that insured firms are overall better able 
to continue operating in the aftermath of a sudden disastrous event. We set out to find the 
evidence that supports this hypothesis; or rather we set out to reject the null hypothesis of no 
observable difference between insured and uninsured firms in the aftermath recovery.  
 
 
  
                                                          
11 See STATA (n.d.a; n.d.b) for more explanations. 
12 See Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) for more explanation on the results of the bias and inconsistency of the linear probability 
model. 
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Chapter 4 
Data Description 
 
The short-term survey was conducted three to six months after the most destructive 
earthquake in February 2011. The questionnaire was originally planned to observe the 
continuing recovery of organizations after the 2010 earthquake. It was then redesigned to also 
capture the impact of the 2011 earthquake. The questionnaire also includes a section on 
insurance coverage. Specifically, the firms were asked about the type of insurance they had 
contracted for at the time of the earthquake. It was sent to 309 organizations.13 The 
organizations that were surveyed were generally located in the Central Business District (CBD) 
of Christchurch and the Lyttleton Town Centre (the site of the main Canterbury region’s deep-
sea port).  
From the information in Table 1.2, there are 176 returned responses but after 
eliminating non-valid responses, we were left with 140 usable responses. Non-valid responses 
were considered as duplicates responses, surveys with missing information for some of the key 
questions, and responses from central and local government entities. State-owned enterprises 
(SOE) are still included in the study as they operate as for-profit organizations according to the 
State-Owned Enterprises Act in 1986 (Laking, 2012).  
According to nationwide statistics shown in Table 4.1, 90% of the firms in New Zealand 
have fewer than five employees. Comparatively, our sample contains a smaller percentage of 
small firms – 55%. Moreover, the overall share of zero-employee businesses in New Zealand is 
69% while the proportion of our samples is only 20%. The aggregate figures for New Zealand, 
however, may be somewhat misleading, as in many cases these very small firms (especially the 
ones with no employees) are inactive or their operations are very small.  So, while our sample is 
                                                          
13 A large share of participants in this short-term survey is the organizations that were in the pre-survey and agreed to 
participate in the ongoing studies of this survey series. The pre-survey was conducted in November 2010, about a month after 
the earthquake in September 2010. It was primarily constructed to observe the impact of the earthquake on organizations 
around Christchurch area. The participants were selected based on their industry sector. In the pre-survey, approximately 100 
firms from 9 unique business sectors, categorized by the Canterbury Regional Economic Development Strategy (CREDS) 2005-
2015, were sampled. A total of 879 firms were called to participate in this survey. The response rate was 43% with a returned 
response of 379 organizations. 
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not representative in the strictest sense, it most likely reflects better the size distribution of 
economically active firms. 
 
Table 4.1  Comparison of number of employees between nationwide and the short-term survey 
Number of 
employees 
1Nationwide 2Short-term Survey 
No. of 
Enterprise 
% Cum.% 
No. of 
Enterprise 
% Cum.% 
0 323,935 68.90% 69% 28 20% 20% 
1-5 97,888 20.80% 90% 49 35% 55% 
6-9 19,571 4.20% 94% 12 9% 64% 
10-19 15,980 3.40% 97% 12 9% 72% 
20-49 8,420 1.80% 99% 13 9% 81% 
50-99 2,489 0.50% 100% 10 7% 89% 
100-499 1,739 0.40% 100% 12 9% 97% 
500+ 324 0.10% 100% 4 3% 100% 
Total 470,346 100%  140 100%  
Source:  1Ministry of Economic Development of New Zealand (2011), 2Author’s calculation 
 
Our core variable in this study is property damage insurance because of the nature of the 
damage (structural and non-structural damage due to the earthquake) and the availability of 
the insurance at the time of the earthquake. Property damage insurance refers to insurance 
coverage for any loss or damage arising to the insured properties caused by the insured perils. 
It includes coverage for property, furniture, fixture, fittings, organization’s contents, assets, 
equipment, and machinery. Adopting the terminology from the labor literature which 
developed the methods to overcome selection bias, acquiring property damage insurance is, 
therefore, the treatment. The firms that had property damage insurance are thus in the 
treatment group and the firms that did not are in the control group.14 We use the words 
‘treatment’ and ‘treated’ to refer to the firms that had property damage insurance.  
                                                          
14 Organizations that indicated that they adopted property insurance coverage may have insured themselves with a commercial 
insurance policy, or, if they are sole traders or operate their business from home, they may be insured under a residential 
insurance policy. Prior to the quake, there was a significant difference between the residential insurance and the commercial 
insurance coverage in New Zealand. While properties insured under commercial insurance were covered on a sum-insured 
basis, properties insured under the residential insurance contract were covered on a replacement basis (which, in principle, 
means that there was no limit on the amount insured). This difference ex post became important as the replacement-basis 
arrangements led to significant and on-going delays in claim settlement following the earthquakes. This distinction, however, 
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The second type of insurance in this study is business interruption insurance (BI). It refers to 
insurance coverage for loss of revenue and/or increased cost of working as a result of damage 
to the insured properties. Note that business interruption insurance is normally purchased with 
property damage insurance (ICNZ, 2013). Moreover, it will trigger only if the insured properties 
covered under the property damage insurance is damaged by the insured perils. If the insured 
property is not damaged due to the insured perils, the BI policy will not cover (ICNZ, 2013). 
Hence, all firms that had adopted business interruption coverage also had adopted property 
damage insurance.15   
Another type of insurance is motor insurance. In this study, we are particularly 
interested in motor insurance for commercial uses such as transportation business. There are 
three types of motor insurance available in New Zealand: (1) Comprehensive cover, (2) Third 
party, fire, and theft, and (3) Third party only (ICNZ, 2013). Only the comprehensive cover 
provides coverage for earthquake. However, we do not have any information of which type of 
motor insurance was purchased by the firms. This makes it difficult to assess the impact of 
having motor insurance coverage on business recovery. 
 
Table 4.2  Number of observations classified by types of insurance 
Type of Insurance Obs. % of Total 
Property Damage (PD) 106 75.70% 
Business Interruption (BI) 68 48.60% 
Motor 73 52.10% 
 
Table 4.2 shows the number of firms that had insurance coverage for property damage (PD), 
business interruption (BI), and motor (MOTOR). Of the total 140 observations, 106 firms had 
property damage insurance at the time of the quake – 76% of the sample. More than half of the 
                                                          
appears not had been perceived as important before or immediately after the earthquake—i.e. before these delays started to 
be noticed—so we do not think they mar our estimation strategy. 
15 In some cases, policyholders could have purchased an extension under business interruption insurance to cover any loss or 
damage to their suppliers and/or customers. In this case, the insured could make a claim to their BI policy even if the firm’s 
insured properties were not damaged. This type of insurance is called “Contingent Business Interruption”. We have no 
information of whether the surveyed firms had this extension covered in their policy. However, a private conversation with the 
Insurance Council of New Zealand on the 1st of April 2014 suggested that the availability of contingent BI coverage in New 
Zealand is limited. 
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firms that had property damage insurance also had business interruption insurance, and 50 
firms had all three types of coverage. 
 The number of firms that had insurance is shown in Table 4.3, classified into three 
groups based on the number of employees. About 69% of the firms with five or fewer 
employees (small-sized) in our dataset had adopted insurance. The firms that employ between 
6 and 49 people (medium-sized) have the highest proportion of insurance adoption which is 
around 90%. About 76 of the firms with greater than 50 employees were insured. Small firms 
might not purchase insurance because they have a self-insurance policy (although micro firms 
might neglect to manage their risk exposure and do not buy insurance). Large firms might have 
their own captive insurance or are self-insured.16 We find only small differences of the average 
number of employees between the treated and the control groups. The firms with (without) 
insurance had an average number of employees of 56 (60) with the standard deviations of 154 
(178). In both cases, the standard deviations are quite large.17 
 
Table 4.3  Number of observations with insurance classified by number of employees 
Number of 
Employees 
Total  
Obs. 
Insured Uninsured 
Obs. % Obs. % 
0 - 5 77 53 68.8% 24 31.2% 
6 - 49 38 34 89.5% 4 10.5% 
50 or more 25 19 76.0% 6 24.0% 
 
The number of firms classified by firm characteristics is shown in Table 4.4. We have about 30 
firms from each ownership structure, i.e. sole proprietorship, partnership, and limited liability 
organizations. When examining the firms by their ownership structure, we find that roughly the 
same proportion of each structure had insurance. With regard to the distribution of the 
location of businesses in this survey, the majority of the firms were located in the Lyttleton 
Town Centre, which is where the earthquake was centered – 82% of these firms had insurance. 
                                                          
16 Captive insurance company is established to provide insurance coverage for its owner (the parent companies) and its 
subsidiaries. Large (and multinational) organizations tend to have their own captive insurance companies as one of their 
subsidiaries. The majority of Fortune 500 companies in the U.S. own captive companies (NAIC, 2014). 
17 See Table 1 in Appendices for the descriptive statistics of total number of employees. 
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Fifteen firms were located in the Central Business District (CBD) area – 67% of them had 
insurance.  
 
Table 4.4  Number of insured vs uninsured observations by firm characteristics 
Definition 
Had insurance  No insurance  
Obs. % Obs. % 
Organisational ownership structure 
Sole proprietorship 34 77.3% 10 22.7% 
Partnership/JV partner 30 85.7% 5 14.3% 
Limited Liability 30 69.8% 13 30.2% 
Location before the earthquake   
CBD 10 66.7% 5 33.3% 
Lyttleton 29 82.9% 6 17.1% 
Kaiapoi  8 72.7% 3 27.3% 
Business Sector 
Retail trade 27 75.0% 9 25.0% 
Wholesale trade 6 100.0% 0 0.0% 
Manufacturing 9 75.0% 3 25.0% 
Construction 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 
Transportation and Warehousing 3 50.0% 3 50.0% 
Fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) 17 85.0% 3 15.0% 
Lifeline utilities 13 81.3% 3 18.8% 
Ownership of Properties  
Own 33 86.8% 5 13.2% 
Rent 73 71.6% 29 28.4% 
For-profit organizations 
For-profit 96 78.7% 26 21.3% 
Not-for-profit 10 55.6% 8 44.4% 
Positive Return on Investment (ROI) in the past five years  
Positive ROI 43 86.0% 7 14.0% 
Risk Management Practice 
Risk management officers 83 76.9% 25 23.1% 
Written BCM 30 71.4% 12 28.6% 
Had practiced emergency response 33 73.3% 12 26.7% 
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The highest number of firms was in retail trade sector – 75% of these firms were insured. There 
are 20 firms in Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) sector – 85% of them had insurance. The 
firms in FMCG sector are from retail, wholesale, and manufacturing sector. FMCG and retail 
trade are positively correlated. Another sector of interest is lifeline utilities. These businesses 
are required, by law, to prepare for emergencies, according to the Civil Defense Emergency Act 
2002. These include, but are not limited to, fuel distribution, the electricity provider, and 
transportation businesses. There are 16 firms in lifeline utilities – 81% of them had insurance. 
The number of firms in other sectors are quite small. 
There are more firms that rent their domiciles than own them in our dataset. About 73% 
of the firms rent their properties – 71% of these firms had insurance. We also have data on risk 
management practices of the firms, i.e. the employment of a risk management officer, having a 
written Business Continuity Management (BCM) plan available, and whether the firms had 
practiced emergency response prior to the quake. The majority of firms had employed risk 
management officers; surprisingly only 77% of these firms had additionally purchased 
insurance. Roughly the same amount of observations had a written BCM available and had 
practiced emergency response prior to the quake, about half of them (26 firms) had both – 
about 70% of them had insurance. Hence, these two variables are positively correlated.  
Table 4.5 shows the impact of the earthquake in various areas. A total of 15 
organizations have permanently closed after the earthquake. From our data, 13 firms were still 
closed at the time that this survey was conducted; though these firms might re-open again once 
they have positive business outlook (Hatton et al., 2014). This on-going closing could be due to 
physical damage or cordons (Stevenson et al., 2012b). This variable is our main focus here. 
From the data, 73% of the firms that had permanently closed also had insurance. The reason for 
business closure could be due to other unobserved factors. Or else, the business closure could 
be due to underinsurance (Muir-Wood, 2012; Brown et al., 2013).  
In addition, 77 firms reported a decrease in revenue – 78% of these firms had insurance. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the actual revenue of the firms. We would have preferred to 
have the actual revenue of the firms before and after the earthquake to examine the impact of 
the earthquake on the change in revenue. Nevertheless, 76 firms had reported their estimated 
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percentage change in revenue as shown in Table 4.6. The revenue was reduced by 25% on 
average for those who had insurance and 47% for those who had no insurance. By analyzing the 
data at face value, it seems that the insured firms experienced less negative impact than the 
uninsured ones.  
 
Table 4.5  Number of insured vs uninsured observations by the impact of the earthquake 
Definition 
Had insurance  No insurance  
Obs. % Obs. % 
Business Closure 
Permanently closed 11 73.3% 4 26.7% 
Temporarily closed 56 75.7% 18 24.3% 
Ongoing closing 13 81.3% 3 18.8% 
The change in revenue after the earthquake  
Decreased 52 77.6% 15 22.4% 
Increased 31 91.2% 3 8.8% 
Unchanged 22 68.8% 10 31.3% 
Structural and non-structural damage 
Structural damage 81 78.6% 22 21.4% 
Non-structural damage 77 81.1% 18 18.9% 
Disrupted by structural damage 56 78.9% 15 21.1% 
Disrupted by non-structural damage 56 82.4% 12 17.6% 
Affected by the 2010 earthquake   
Affected by the 2010 earthquake 91 76.5% 28 23.5% 
Revenue decreased 43 79.6% 11 20.4% 
Financial Recovery Plan  
Plan to recover through insurance 45 100% N/A 
Plan to recover through organization's cash flow 76 78.4% 21 21.6% 
Expected to receive wage subsidy 35 85.4% 6 14.6% 
 
Table 4.6  Average percentage change in revenue after the 2010 and 2011 earthquake 
Description 
Insured Uninsured 
Obs. 
% 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min,  
Max 
Obs. 
% 
Mean 
(SD) 
Min,  
Max 
Percentage change in revenue 76 -25.13 -100%, 13 -47.62 -100%, 
85.4% (45.84) 100% 14.6% (38.33) 5% 
Percentage change in revenue 
after the first EQ 
61 -12.84 -100%, 11 -24.28 -60%, 
84.7% (25.77) 25% 15.3% (23.24) 20% 
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With regard to the structural and non-structural damage, almost all firms reported that they 
experienced structural damage following the earthquake. Of all these firms, 71 firms reported 
that their businesses were disrupted by structural damage – 79% of them had insurance. Similar 
numbers of firms had experienced non-structural damage which includes the damage to 
furniture, fixtures, fittings, equipment, machinery, inventory, and motor vehicles – 82% of them 
had insurance.  
 In addition to the damage from the 2011 earthquake, we also have data regarding the 
2010 earthquake. Almost all the firms reported that they were affected by the earthquake in 
2010 and 54 firms also reported that their revenue had decreased after the 2010 quake. 
Although the 2010 earthquake had a more minor impact on businesses than the 2011 one, the 
firms that might have survived had they experienced only one earthquake might not be able to 
survive after the latter series of earthquake. On average, nonetheless, the firms that had 
insurance seem to experience less negative impact on their revenue after both earthquakes. 
Three survey questions focus on the firms’ recovery plans; i.e. whether they plan to 
recover through insurance, to recover using the organization’s cash flow, or plan to use the 
wage subsidy available from the National Government. The majority of the firms reported that 
they plan to recover through their organization’s cash flow. Interestingly, only 45 firms reported 
that they plan to recover through insurance even though more than twice as many firms 
reported that they had insurance. The survey was implemented fairly soon after the 
earthquake, so it might be the case that respondents were focusing on the more-immediate 
source of funding available (though at that point in time it was not yet apparent that it will take 
several years for most claims to be processed). About 40 firms expect to also receive a wage 
subsidy from the government – 85% of them had insurance. 
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Chapter 5 
Empirical Results 
  
The first section lists the variables for propensity score estimation (PSM) and linear probability 
model (LPM). The second section presents the empirical results of PSM and LPM separately. 
 
5.1 Variables 
We categorize the variables into two groups: variables for propensity scores estimation and 
variables for the regression analysis. In each group of variables, there are both outcome 
variables and explanatory variables. We adapt the list of explanatory variables that potentially 
influence business recovery from the paper by Webb et al. (2002). The details of each group of 
variables are discussed separately below. 
5.1.1 Variables for Propensity Score Estimation 
In estimating propensity scores, the outcome variable is insurance adoption. The 
variable equals 1 if the firm purchased property damage insurance (which is the main insurance 
coverage for natural disasters) and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variable is a set of pre-
treatment variables. In this research, we use the characteristics of the organizations as pre-
treatment variables because these variables are time constant and potentially determine the 
treatment choice. These firm-characteristics are employed to estimate the propensity scores 
which are the probability of adopting insurance prior to the earthquake of each firm. The pre-
treatment variables including the means and standard deviations are listed in Table 5.1. There 
are 16 pre-treatment variables in total. The categories of the pre-treatment variables include 
firm size, ownership structure, location prior to the earthquake, business sector, and risk 
management practice of firms.  
We create two dummy variables to represent the firm size. One variable represents 
small firms that employ five people or less; one variable represents larger firms that employ 50 
employees or more. We have two dummy variables to capture the ownership structure, that is 
sole proprietorship companies and limit liability companies. We use these two ownership 
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structure to represent the firms that are potentially small (sole proprietorship) and the firms 
that are potentially large (limited liability companies). 
 
Table 5.1  List of the pre-treatment variables, their means and standard deviations 
Variable 
Insured Uninsured 
M SD M SD 
Firm Size 
ESMALL5 1 = employ full-time employees less than 5 0.5 0.51 0.71 0.47 
ELARGE50 1 = employ full-time employees greater than 50 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 
Organisational Ownership Structure 
OSOLE 1 = sole proprietorship company 0.33 0.47 0.3 0.47 
OLTD 1 = limited liability company 0.29 0.46 0.39 0.5 
Location Before the Earthquake 
LCBD 1 = located in Central Business District (CBD) 0.1 0.3 0.15 0.36 
LLYT 1 = located in Lyttleton Town Centre 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.39 
Business Sector 
BRT 1 = retail trade 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 
BFMCG 1 = FMCG (Fast-Moving Consumer Goods) 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.29 
BUTIL 1 = lifeline utilities 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 
Risk Management Practice 
RDPT 1 = have risk management department/staff 0.79 0.42 0.74 0.45 
RBCM 1 = have business continuity plan (BCM) 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.49 
REMG 1 = had practiced emergency response 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.49 
ROI 
1 = positive average annual return on 
investment (ROI) in the past 5 years 
0.41 0.5 0.21 0.42 
OWN 1 = own the business premise 0.32 0.47 0.15 0.36 
PROF 1 = for-profit organization 0.91 0.3 0.77 0.44 
NSITE number of sites (nationwide) 54.56 485.89 16.21 53.34 
 
We create two dummy variables to represent the physical location of firms before the 
earthquake. The first variable represents the firms that were located in the Central Business 
District (CBD) area which is where the government had restricted access for over two years 
after the quake. The second dummy variable represents the firms that were located in the 
Lyttleton Town Centre which is where the organizations were most affected by the first 
earthquake. We have three variables representing business sectors which are retail trade, fast-
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moving consumer goods (FMCG), and lifeline utilities. Three dummy variables are used to 
capture the risk management practice of each organization which are having risk management 
department/staff, had practiced emergency response, and had business continuity plan in 
place. These variables are included in our study because we assume that firms with better risk 
management practice might have higher insurance take-up. 
We have three more dummy variables to capture the return on investment, the 
ownership of business premises, and whether the firm is a for-profit organization. The return 
on investment is used to capture the financial situation of firms prior to the earthquake and is 
expected to increase the probability of insurance adoption. For the ownership of the business 
premises, we assume that taking ownership of its business premises would increase the 
probability of adopting insurance owing to the fact that the insured would have direct insurable 
interest over the owned properties. In addition, we have one continuous variable which is the 
total number of business sites in New Zealand. We assume that the higher number of business 
locations, the more likely they are to acquire insurance coverage. 
5.1.2 Variables for Linear Probability Model  
In this group of variables, the main outcome of interest is whether the firm survives in 
the aftermath of the earthquake. Most firms have temporarily closed after the earthquake, 
therefore, we define survival as firms that are not permanently closed three to six months after 
the incident. As with the objective of this paper, we aim to investigate whether having 
insurance increases the probability of business survival immediately after the earthquake. 
The explanatory variables are a set of independent variables that capture the level of 
damage and disruption following the earthquake. The variables include the change in revenue, 
the disruption of structural and non-structural damage, the impact of the 2010 earthquake, and 
the financial recovery plan of the firms. The mean and standard deviations of each variable are 
shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2  List of the variables for regression, their means and standard deviations 
Variable Definition 
Insured Uninsured 
M SD M SD 
Outcome Variable 
SURV 1 = still operating (not permanently closed) 0.9 0.31 0.89 0.33 
Insurance 
INS 1 = had property damage insurance 0.76 0.43 N/A 
BI 1 = had business interruption insurance 0.64 0.48 N/A 
The Change in Revenue After the Earthquake  
REVDE 1 = the firm's revenue had decreased  0.5 0.51 0.45 0.51 
REVCH percentage of the change in revenue -18.02 40.38 -18.21 32.96 
Structural and Non-Structural Damage  
DSTRUC 
1 = moderately or highly disrupted by structural 
damage 
0.53 0.51 0.45 0.51 
DNONSTR 
1 = moderately or highly disrupted by non-
structural damage 
0.53 0.51 0.36 0.49 
Affected by the 2010 Earthquake 
BREVDE 1 = the firm's revenue had decreased  0.41 0.5 0.33 0.48 
Financial Recovery 
RINS 1 = plan to recover through insurance 0.43 0.5 N/A 
RCF 1 = finance recovery with organizational cash flow 0.72 0.46 0.62 0.5 
RWAGE 1 = entitled to earthquake wage subsidy 0.34 0.48 0.18 0.39 
CDAY number of closing days 8.27 24.53 10.22 28.05 
 
Two insurance variables, property damage insurance (INS) and business interruption insurance 
(BI) are included in the model to see the effect of insurance on the outcome variables. To 
capture the physical damage of the earthquake, two dummy variables indicating whether the 
firm’s operation was disrupted (stopped) by structural and non-structural damage are used in 
the estimations. There are some organizations that experience structural and/or non-structural 
damage but their business operation are not affected. Therefore, we use dummy variables to 
capture the disruption (rather than the damage) of structural and/or non-structural damage 
instead. 
To capture the change in revenue, we use two dummy variables to indicate whether the 
firm’s revenue had decreased after the earthquake and the percentage change in revenue. We 
have one more variable to represent the impact of the 2010 earthquake on revenue. This is a 
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dummy variable that indicate whether the firm’s revenue had decreased after the 2010 
earthquake. In addition, we have three variables that represent how each firm planned to 
finance its recovery. According to our data, three major methods of funding recovery are 
through insurance, organizational cash flow, and government’s wage subsidy.  
 
5.2 Empirical Results 
The empirical results of propensity scores matching and linear probability model are presented 
in detail in the following section. 
5.2.1 Propensity Scores Estimation 
We are looking for a model that could estimate the propensity scores such that there 
will be no significant difference between the treated and untreated firms. Table 5.3 shows the 
estimated coefficients of logit regression. The mean and the standard deviation of the 
estimated propensity scores are 0.757 and 0.184 respectively as shown in Table 5.4. The range 
of the estimated propensity score is 0.261 and 0.993. Although some of the estimated 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero, we include them in the model. As noted by 
Schafer and Kang (2008), the fit statistics of the overall model is more important in propensity 
scores estimation.  
In the next step, we discard the observations that lie outside of common support region 
in order to eliminate the observations whose estimated probability of acquiring insurance is too 
high (they would have always purchased insurance) or too low (they would have never acquired 
insurance under any observable circumstances). The common support ensures that there are 
observations, in both treatment and control groups, that have (almost) identical probability of 
assigning to the treatment.  
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Table 5.3  Estimated coefficients of propensity scores  
Variable Coefficient  Robust S.E. 
ESMALL5 -1.33 ** 0.62 
ELARGE50 -1.27 * 0.84 
OSOLE -0.32  0.59 
OLTD -0.92  0.74 
LCBD -0.30  0.68 
LLYT 0.60  0.67 
BRT -0.29  0.54 
BFMCG 1.34 * 0.78 
BUTIL 0.86  0.93 
RDPT 0.51  0.52 
RBCM -1.00 * 0.63 
REMG -0.43  0.59 
ROI 0.72  0.56 
OWN 0.00  0.00 
PROF 0.92 * 0.61 
NSITE 1.08  0.65 
_cons 1.05  0.80 
 
Log-likelihood -64.6207   
Wald χ2 26.9   
P-value 0.0426 **  
Pseudo R2  0.1674    
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
 
Table 5.4  Means and standard deviations of the estimated propensity scores 
Estimated 
Propensity score 
Treatment 
(Insured) 
Control 
(Uninsured) 
Mean 0.757 0.801 0.619 
Std.Dev. 0.184 0.156 0.197 
Min 0.261 0.351 0.261 
Max 0.993 0.993 0.915 
Obs. 140 106 34 
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The classic way of choosing a common support region is by reviewing a visual distribution of the 
estimated propensity scores (for example, a histogram18) and choosing the overlap scores of 
the treated and the control group. However, this method might not be feasible in many cases 
when the visual distribution does not explicitly show an overlap area of the treated and the 
control group. In this study, we select the observations in the common support region using 
Minima and Maxima criterion as introduced by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). The basic 
principle of Minima and Maxima criterion is to eliminate all observations whose associated 
propensity scores are below the minimum and over the maximum of the opposite group.  
 
Figure 5.1  Boxplot of estimated propensity scores before (left) and after (right) matched 
  
 
The Minima and Maxima criterion from the estimated propensity scores in our study is [0.351, 
0.915] as shown in Table 5.4. We have 4 observations from the control units (the firms that do 
not have insurance) below the minima criterion, i.e. P(INS𝑖0 = 1| X) <0.351, and 31 
observations from the treated units (the firms that had insurance) over the maxima criterion, 
i.e.  P(INS𝑖1 = 1| X) > 0.915. Consequently, we remove 35 outliers from the estimation. Figure 
5.1 shows the boxplot before and after eliminating the outliers. After removing the outliers, the 
estimated propensity scores of the treated and control units are better matched.  
After that, we stratify the data into four sub-groups based on the estimated propensity 
scores, henceforth refer to as Blocks. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) conclude that stratifying the 
                                                          
18 See Figure 1 in Appendices for the visual distribution of the estimated propensity scores. 
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data based on the estimated propensity scores into five stratums can reduce approximately 
90% of the observed selection bias. We stratified the estimated scores into four groups due to 
limited number of observations. We initially tested the difference-in-mean of the X covariates 
in both five and four blocks using the standard t-test as suggested by Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002). The covariates between the treatment and the control groups in each block are more 
similar when stratifying into four sub-groups.  
The number of observations of adopting insurance in each block as well as the t-score of 
difference-in-mean are shown in Table 5.5. It is clearly shown that the mean probability of 
buying insurance between the treated and control units are significantly different using total 
observations. However, after stratifying the data into blocks, we found that there is no 
significant difference-in-mean of propensity scores between the treated and the control units in 
each block. We further test the difference-in-mean of all X covariates in each block. We found 
some significant differences in the mean of some X covariates in some blocks. Minor covariates’ 
imbalance is allowed because we do not implement exact one-to-one matching. 
 
Table 5.5  Number of observations and the mean propensity scores in each block 
Block 
Number of Observations 
Mean (SD) Min (Max) t-score 
 
Total Treatment Control  
All 105 75 30 0.72 (0.16) 0.35 (0.92) -5.5454 *** 
Block 1 25 12 13 0.49 (0.07) 0.35 (0.59) 0. 8264  
Block 2 27 20 7 0.68 (0.06) 0.6 (0.76) 0. 2456  
Block 3 26 22 4 0.81 (0.02) 0.77 (0.85) -0. 0689  
Block 4 27 21 6 0.88 (0.02) 0.85 (0.92) 1. 5297  
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
 
Table 5.5 shows the number of observations and the mean propensity scores in each block. 
Each block has different number of observations in the treatment and the control groups. 
However, we have relatively sufficient number of observations in each block that allows us to 
further estimate the causal effect of insurance on the outcome variable. The observations in 
Block 1 are the firms that have the least likelihood to acquire insurance with an average score 
of 49%. The firms in Block 4 are the firms with the highest likelihood to acquire insurance with 
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an average score of 88%. The average probability of insurance adoption of Block 3 and Block 4 
are quite similar with small standard deviations. In term of number of treated and control units 
in each stratum, Block 1 is the only block which has more units in the control group than in the 
treatment group. 
At this stage, the observations in each block are assumed to be indifferent in all ways 
except the treatment conditions (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Hence, the samples in each block 
are assumed to be randomized (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, and 1984). As discussed previously, 
a combination of propensity score and regression increase the efficiency of the estimates 
(Imbens, 2004). We are thus able to include additional control variables that do not determine 
the treatment choice (purchase insurance) but may have an impact on the outcome of interest 
(firm’s post-quake survival). In this case, we are able to control for the different level of damage 
wrought by the earthquake to each firm in each block.  
5.2.2 Linear Probability Model 
After stratifying the data based on the estimated propensity scores, we run the standard 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) regression on each block separately, estimated with White’s 
standard errors. The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 5.6.  
Initially, we run a separate regression without control variables using INS as the 
independent variable. The coefficient in Block 4, which is the firms that have the highest 
likelihood of acquiring insurance, shows positive coefficient whereas the other blocks show 
negative signs. As such, the firms with high likelihood of having insurance appear to have 
positive effect of insurance on business recovery – 28 percentage point more likely to continue 
operating in the aftermath. Comparatively, the firms with less likelihood to have insurance, 
Block 1, show 1.3 percentage point less likely to continue its operation.  
However, these results do not remain once we add the control variables —those that 
control for the damage of the earthquake— the signs have changed in the different direction. 
The overall fit of the models of Block 1 and Block 2 are significant at 0.05 significance level with 
adjusted r2 of 28.2% and 25.4% respectively while the models of Block 3 and Block 4 are not 
significant. Note that the insurance variable, INS, is not significant in any cases. 
38 
 
Table 5.6  Estimated coefficients of Limited Probability Model (LPM) 
Variables 
All Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
No control variables 
INS 0.014 0.063 -0.013 0.153 -0.15 0.083 -0.091 0.064 0.286 0.206 
_cons 0.882 0.056 0.846 0.104 1 N/A 1 N/A 0.667 0.2 
With control variables 
INS 0.062 0.065 0.096 0.187 0.077 0.133 0.065 0.133 0.131 0.373 
BI -0.029 0.057 -0.238 0.274 -0.237 0.166 0.018 0.169 0.192 0.191 
CDAY 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.088 0.07 
REVDE -0.064 0.08 -0.341 0.171 0.352 0.208 -0.036 0.165 0.059 0.216 
REVCH 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 
DSTRUC -0.123 0.056 0.014 0.225 -0.114 0.115 0.127 0.187 -0.311 0.18 
DNONSTR -0.085 0.05 -0.375 0.315 0.132 0.135 -0.229 0.171 0.029 0.088 
BREVDE 0.068 0.059 0.052 0.309 0.049 0.12 0.203 0.138 0.057 0.135 
RINS 0.022 0.063 -0.048 0.317 0.124 0.129 0.077 0.183 -0.057 0.116 
RCF -0.112 0.069 -0.305 0.207 -0.231 0.123 -0.354 0.224 0.285 0.219 
RWAGE 0.102 0.059 0.26 0.142 0.169 0.121 0.125 0.135 -0.029 0.21 
_cons 0.92 0.055 1.025 0.14 0.81 0.125 0.884 0.114 0.668 0.209 
 
Obs.  140  25  27  26  27 
P-value  0.043 ** 0.047 ** 0.046 ** 0.962  0.326 
Adjusted R2  0.151   0.282   0.254   0.029   0.294 
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
 
The insurance variable in all blocks shows positive signs. The firms in Block 4, which is the firms 
with the highest likelihood of acquiring insurance, seems to have the highest effect of insurance 
on business survival – 13.1 percentage point more likely to survive the earthquake. 
Comparatively, the firm in Block 1, the ones with the least likelihood of acquiring insurance has 
the second highest likelihood of survival – 9.6 percentage point more likely.  
Interestingly, the firms in Block 1 and Block 2, which are the firms that have less 
likelihood to adopt insurance, have approximately 23 percentage point less likely to continue its 
operation if they have business interruption insurance. Contrastingly, the firm in Block 4 have 
19 percentage point higher likelihood to continue its business operation if they have BI. 
Assuming a firm had adopted both property damage and business interruption insurance, 
holding other things equal, the impact of both insurance on Block 1 and Block 2 would be 
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negative. Comparatively, the impact of both insurance on Block 3 and Block 4 would be positive 
but they are not statistically significant. Nonetheless, we find little evidence to support the 
hypothesis that insurance supports immediate business recovery in the aftermath of a disaster. 
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PART II LONGER-TERM SURVEY 
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Chapter 6 
Methodological Framework 
 
In this part, we aim to investigate the role of insurance on longer-term business recovery during 
reconstruction phase (two to three years after the earthquake). In this period, reconstructions 
are on-going. All insured firms have notified their claims to the insurance companies. In this 
instance, the role of insurance is more apparent as in most cases at least some insurance claims 
were disbursed. Therefore, the research objective for longer-term analysis is to investigate the 
direct role of insurance claim in supporting firms’ recovery.  
As we are constrained by the types of the survey questions, the outcome variables of 
interest are all binary. Therefore, a non-linear model, a logistic regression, is used for analysis 
(Gujarati, 2003). As heteroscedasticity is likely to present in the model, we use White’s standard 
errors for robustness. The model to estimate the effect of insurance on business recovery is as 
follows: 
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖, 𝑋𝑖) = 𝐹(𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖) 
Where 𝑌𝑖 is the outcome variable denoting 1 if the response to the survey question was 
positive, and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables. The list of outcome variables and 
independent variables are listed in Table 8.1. 𝜏 is the estimated average treatment effect of 
insurance on the outcome variable. 𝛽 is a vector of the estimated coefficients of 𝑋𝑖. 𝐹 is the 
cumulative distribution function of logistic distribution.  
The probability of successful outcome (𝑃𝑖) conditional on 𝑋 covariates can be written as: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐹(𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖) =  
𝑒𝛼+𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖+𝛽𝑋𝑖
1 +  𝑒𝛼+𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖+𝛽𝑋𝑖
 
The slope coefficients of the logit model can be interpreted as the change in the log of the odds 
ratio given a unit change in the regressor, holding other things constant. The logit model can be 
written as: 
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𝐿𝑖 =  ln (
𝑃𝑖
1 −  𝑃𝑖
) =  𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖  
Where 𝐿𝑖  is the Logit, and (
𝑃𝑖
1− 𝑃𝑖
) is the odds ratio.  
In this case, the marginal effect is given by:  
𝜕Pr (𝑌 = 1)
𝜕(𝑧𝑖)
=  
𝑒𝑧𝛽
(1 +  𝑒𝑧𝛽)2
𝜕(𝑧𝛽)
𝜕(𝑧𝑖)
=  
𝑒𝑧𝛽
(1 +  𝑒𝑧𝛽)2
𝛽  
Where 𝑧𝑖 is the regressors and 𝑧𝛽 is (𝛼 + 𝜏 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖). 
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Chapter 7 
Data Description 
 
The insurance section in the questionnaire asks firms if they plan to finance their recovery 
through insurance; what type of insurance they had at the time of the earthquake; whether 
they have submitted claims; whether they believe their insurance coverage is adequate; and 
what proportion of their claim was already paid out.  
The longer-term survey was undertaken in 2013.19 The sample was selected based on 
two criteria. First, the participants must have one or more premises located in the districts that 
experienced serious physical damage by the 2011 earthquake: Christchurch city, Selwyn, and 
Waimakariri districts. Secondly, the participants were sampled from 19 different sectors 
defined by Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC).  
The questionnaire was initially sent to 2,176 unique organizations (a branch of an 
organization was treated as a representation of one unique organization). The response rate 
was approximately 25%. As shown in Table 1.2, there are 541 returned responses but after 
removing non-valid responses, we were left with 461 participants. Non-valid responses were 
duplicate responses, surveys with missing information for some of the key questions, and 
responses from public sector. Table 7.11 compares the number of firms in our sample against 
the nationwide numbers. Half of our sample employs less than 10 people with the majority of 
organizations employing between 1 to 5 people. The mean and standard deviation of total 
employees are 86 and 468 respectively. 
Table 7.2 presents the number of insured organizations classified by types of insurance 
they have. The definition of each type of insurance is described earlier in chapter 4. Out of 461 
valid responses, 432 observations are insured with property damage insurance and 288 
observations are insured with both property damage and business interruption insurance. With 
this being the case, we chose the insured observations for the analysis in order to prevent any 
unobserved differences between insured and uninsured firms. Therefore, the total number of 
                                                          
19 See Brown et al. (2014) for detailed description of the survey.  
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observation in this study is 432 insured firms. As shown in Table 7.3, 67% of our sample also 
had Business Interruption insurance (BI).  
 
Table 7.1  Comparison of number of employees between nationwide and longer-term survey 
Number of 
employees 
1Nationwide 2Longer-term Survey 
No. of Enterprise % Cum.% No. of Enterprise % Cum.% 
0 323,935 69% 69% 5 1% 1% 
1-5 97,888 21% 90% 140 30% 31% 
6-9 19,571 4% 94% 73 16% 47% 
10-19 15,980 3% 97% 90 20% 67% 
20-49 8,420 2% 99% 69 15% 82% 
50-99 2,489 1% 100% 30 7% 88% 
100-499 1,739 0% 100% 41 9% 97% 
500+ 324 0% 100% 13 3% 100% 
Total 470,346 100%   461 100%   
Source:  1Ministry of Economic Development of New Zealand (2011), 2Author’s calculation 
 
Table 7.2  Number of observations classified by types of insurance 
Type of Insurance Obs. % of Total 
Property Damage (PD) 432 100% 
Business Interruption (BI) 288 67% 
 
Table 7.3  Descriptive statistics of insurance section from the survey 
Definition M SD 
Adopted business interruption insurance 0.67 0.47 
Filed insurance claim 0.7 0.46 
Believe coverage is adequate 0.55 0.5 
Received over 80% of claim payout 0.44 0.5 
Adequately Insured with Payout over 80% 0.38 0.49 
 
Since all observations are insured and affected by the earthquake, it is interesting that only 70% 
of them had filed a claim, as shown in Table 7.3. Two plausible explanations are that their 
insurance does not cover for damage they incurred and/or the cost of damage for these 
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organizations may be lower than the deductible (the initial amount of loss that is required to be 
absorbed by the insured).  Notably, only half of the sample believe their insurance is adequate. 
Of those that submitted a claim, nearly half had received almost full insurance payout. 
However, only 38% of the total sample received payout over 80% and believe that their 
coverage is adequate.  
 
Table 7.4  The distribution of observations between core variables and outcome variables 
Description 
BI No BI Adequately Insured Not Adequately Insured 
Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % Obs. % 
Operating 281 65.0% 142 32.9% 161 37.3% 262 60.6% 
Not Operating 7 1.6% 2 0.5% 2 0.5% 7 1.6% 
Profitable 208 48.1% 92 21.3% 121 28.0% 179 41.4% 
Not Profitable 80 18.5% 52 12.0% 42 9.7% 90 20.8% 
Increased 
Productivity 
158 36.6% 57 13.2% 80 18.5% 135 31.3% 
Not Increased 
Productivity 
130 30.1% 87 20.1% 83 19.2% 134 31.0% 
Better-off 127 29.4% 53 12.3% 72 16.7% 108 25.0% 
Not Better-off 161 37.3% 91 21.1% 91 21.1% 161 37.3% 
 
In this study, we emphasize two insurance questions: whether the firm adopts business 
interruption insurance, and whether the firm is adequately insured and received payout over 
80%. Table 7.4 shows the distribution of observations between our core variables and main 
outcome variables of interest. Note that 1% of sample had BI and do not continue their 
operations while 0.5% of sample stops their operations even though they are adequately 
insured. Since we do not have much variation in terms of number of firms that are operating, 
this variable cannot be used. While most firms also adopted business interruption insurance, a 
large share of them reported that their insurance coverage is inadequate, even when they 
receive nearly full payout. Henceforth, for easy reference, we use ‘adequately insured’ to refer 
to the firms that reported that they are adequately insured and received insurance payout over 
80%. 
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In term of profitability, 48% of sample are firms with BI and are profitable. Notwithstanding, 
only 28% of sample indicated that they are adequately insured and profitable. We use 
profitability as a proxy that indicates whether firms had recovered from the disaster. Overall, 
there are more profitable firms in the sample than unprofitable. Unfortunately, the level of 
profitability is not known. 
In term of increased productivity, 37% of sample had BI and increased their productivity 
in the aftermath. Comparatively, only 19% of sample are adequately insured. There are roughly 
equal number of firms that increased their productivity level versus otherwise (decreased or 
unchanged). Some firms also reported that their productivity has decreased after the 
earthquake. In the survey, there is one question asking whether the firm is better off after the 
earthquake. Approximately 30% of firms are better off with BI while only 17% of firms are 
better off while adequately insured. The number of observations is detailed in Table 7.5 which 
also presents the total number of observations in different categories classified into firms that 
had business interruption insurance and firms that are adequately insured with nearly full 
payout.  
For the industry sector, a large share of firms in our sample are in retail and wholesale 
trade, and manufacturing sector while the sector with the least amount of sample are in 
financial services and insurance industry. Note that the original survey has a total of 19 
different sectors but we use only 6 sectors for analysis. Some sectors are not included due to 
small number of observations (less than 10), uninsurable for property and business interruption 
insurance (e.g. agriculture), and no literature of economic implications of disaster impact (e.g. 
arts). In addition, some sectors are left out of the model because the overall model is better fit 
without (higher pseudo R2). The six sectors are health care and social assistance, 
manufacturing, construction, accommodation, financial services and insurance, and retail and 
wholesale trade. Within each industry, the majority of firms also adopted business interruption 
insurance except in construction business which has approximately equal share of firms with BI 
versus without BI.    
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Table 7.5  Total number of observations in different categories classified into firms that had 
business interruption insurance and firms that are adequately insured 
Definition 
Total 
Obs. 
Had BI No BI 
Adequately Insured 
Yes No 
Obs % Obs % Obs % Obs % 
Industry Sector          
Health Care And Social 
Assistance 
44 31 70.5% 13 29.5% 15 34.1% 29 65.9% 
Manufacturing 78 60 76.9% 18 23.1% 33 42.3% 45 57.7% 
Construction 41 20 48.8% 21 51.2% 10 24.4% 31 75.6% 
Accommodation 46 38 82.6% 8 17.4% 26 56.5% 20 43.5% 
Financial Services And 
Insurance 
21 17 81.0% 4 19.0% 12 57.1% 9 42.9% 
Retail And Wholesale Trade 79 57 72.2% 22 27.8% 25 31.6% 54 68.4% 
Ownership Structure          
Sole Proprietorship 66 43 65.2% 23 34.8% 22 33.3% 44 66.7% 
Partnership 34 21 61.8% 13 38.2% 15 44.1% 19 55.9% 
Private Limited Liability 
Company 
262 184 70.2% 78 29.8% 101 38.5% 161 61.5% 
Public Limited Liability 
Company 
14 10 71.4% 4 28.6% 4 28.6% 10 71.4% 
Size of Organization          
10 Employees Or Less 216 133 61.6% 83 38.4% 68 31.5% 148 68.5% 
Greater Than 50 Employees 73 59 80.8% 14 19.2% 30 41.1% 43 58.9% 
Disruption by the EQ          
Structural Damage 162 110 67.9% 52 32.1% 67 41.4% 95 58.6% 
Non-Structural Damage  201 137 68.2% 64 31.8% 85 42.3% 116 57.7% 
Difficult Access to Premises 127 78 61.4% 49 38.6% 49 38.6% 78 61.4% 
Financial Status          
Currently have High Debt 36 24 66.7% 12 33.3% 13 36.1% 23 63.9% 
Finance its Recovery with 
Organizational Cash Flow  
197 49 72.1% 19 27.9% 86 43.7% 111 56.3% 
Located in CBD 316 214 67.7% 102 32.3% 125 39.6% 191 60.4% 
Had Emergency Plan in 
Place 
308 210 68.2% 98 31.8% 122 39.6% 186 60.4% 
For-Profit Organization 398 272 68.3% 126 31.7% 146 36.7% 252 63.3% 
Own The Current Property 188 120 63.8% 68 36.2% 70 37.2% 118 62.8% 
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With regard to the ownership structure of our sample, the majority of firms are private limited 
liability companies (limited liability companies that are not listed on the stock exchange). We 
also categorize ownership structure as sole traders, partnership organization, and public limited 
liability company (listed firms). The majority of firms in each category adopted business 
interruption insurance while most of them are inadequately insured. 
With regard to the size of organizations, the mean (standard deviation) of total number 
of employees is 86 (468) with a range between 0 and 7000 people. We also have two dummy 
variables to represent the firms that employ less than 10 people and firms that employ more 
than 50 people. 
Regarding the damage from the earthquake, most firms experienced damage and loss 
but not all of them reported that their business operations were also disrupted. Three main 
statistics are presented including structural damage, nonstructural damage and difficulties 
accessing the premises. The business operations of most firms were disrupted by nonstructural 
damage, approximately 47% of the total sample, which includes damage to furniture, fixture, 
fittings, inventory, motor, equipment, and machinery breakdown. Approximately 38% of the 
total sample also experienced structural damage. In addition, 29% of firms were disrupted 
because of difficulties of getting access to the business sites.  
With regard to the financial situation, there are 197 firms that have financed their 
recovery with organizational cash flow – 72% of them had BI insurance. In addition, 35 firms 
said they had moderate to high debt but the definition of the level of debt is subjective. 
Additionally, a large number of firms in the survey located in the Central Business District (CBD) 
of the city of Christchurch. 92% of our sample are for-profit organizations. Roughly the same 
number of firms own their domicile and rent it. 
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Chapter 8 
Empirical Results 
 
 The first section lists the outcome variables, the core variables, and the control variables from 
the longer-term survey. The second section discusses the correlation among the outcome and 
the core variables. It is followed by the results of the logit regression estimations.  
 
8.1 Variables 
In this study, there are three outcome variables, two core variables of interest, and a number of 
control variables. Table 8.1 lists the variables and their definition. Each variable is detailed 
below. 
8.1.1 Outcome Variables 
All three outcome variables are binary. The first is the profitability of firms after disaster. 
This variable represents the financial status of each organizations following the earthquake. 
Current positive financial status of the affected organizations after a disaster is a proxy to 
measure how well a firm is performing after the disaster. As there are both for-profit and not-
for-profit organizations in this study, we use the status of financial surplus for the not-for-profit 
organizations instead of profitability. For for-profit organizations, this variable equals 1 if the 
current organization’s profitability is moderate or high. For not-for-profit organizations, this 
variable equals 1 if the organization has a financial surplus, either low or high, at the time of the 
survey. There are 6 missing values for this variable and they are coded as 0 for analysis. These 
missing values are assumed to be missingness at random where the probability of missing is 
supposedly due to information availability (by reviewing the responses to other questions); it is 
generally coded missing values in this case as zero for logistic regression (Gelman and Hill, 
2006).  
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Table 8.1  Variable description 
Variable Definition M SD Min Max 
Core Variables 
BI 1 = had business interruption insurance 0.67 0.47 0 1 
CADQ 1 = claim payout over 80% and the coverage is adequate 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Outcome Variables 
YPROF 1 = moderately/highly profitable for commercial and 
1 = financial surplus for non-profit organizations 
0.69 0.46 0 1 
YPROD 1 = slight/greatly increased productivity level 0.5 0.5 0 1 
YBETO 1 = slightly/significantly better-off 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Level of Disruption by the EQ 
DSTRUC 1 = moderately/highly disrupted by structural damage 0.38 0.48 0 1 
DNONST 1 = moderately/highly disrupted by non-structural damage  0.47 0.5 0 1 
DPREM 1 = moderately/highly difficulties accessing premises  0.29 0.46 0 1 
Industry Sector 
SHEA 1 = health care and social assistance 0.1 0.3 0 1 
SMAN 1 = manufacturing 0.18 0.39 0 1 
SCON 1 = construction 0.09 0.29 0 1 
SACC 1 = accommodation 0.11 0.31 0 1 
SFIN 1 = financial services and insurance 0.05 0.22 0 1 
SRW 1 = retail and wholesale trade 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Ownership Structure 
OSOLE 1 = sole proprietorship 0.15 0.36 0 1 
OPART 1 = partnership 0.08 0.27 0 1 
OPRIV 1 = private limited liability company 0.61 0.49 0 1 
OPUB 1 = public limited liability company 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Size of Organization 
ELE10 1 = employ 10 employees or less 0.5 0.5 0 1 
EGR50 1 = employ greater than 50 employees 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Location  
LCBD 1 = located in CBD 0.73 0.44 0 1 
LCANT current number of locations in Canterbury 1.61 3.52 0 70 
LNZ current number of locations in New Zealand 6.49 29.08 0 452 
OWN 1 = own the current property 0.44 0.5 0 1 
Financial Status 
FREVC % revenue from Canterbury prior to the EQ 66.79 35.18 0 100 
FDEBT 1 = currently have high/very high debt 0.08 0.28 0 1 
FOCF 1 = finance recovery with organizational cash flow  0.46 0.5 0 1 
NYR number of years operating before the EQ 18.17 21.6 0 155 
EMG 1 = had emergency plan in place 0.71 0.45 0 1 
PROF 1 = for-profit organization 0.92 0.27 0 1 
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The second outcome variable is the level of productivity of firms after the disaster. This variable 
represents changes in the firm’s operation after the earthquake. The question asks firms if their 
current productivity greatly/slightly increased, decreased or remained the same. It equals 1 if 
the organization’s level of productivity has slightly or greatly increased after the earthquake 
and 0 otherwise. There are three missing values for this variable which are coded as 0. These 
missing values are also the case of missingness at random which is often coded as zero for 
logistic regression (Gelman and Hill, 2006). The ability to expand productivity level after a 
natural disaster could potentially be a good measure for successful recovery. The third outcome 
variable is whether the firm is better-off as a result of the earthquake. Even though this 
question is especially subjective, it would be informative to see the relationship of this variable 
with insurance variables. This variable equals 1 if the firm is significantly or slightly better off as 
a result of the earthquake and 0 otherwise. 
8.1.2 Core variables 
There are two core variables of interest for us. The first is whether the organization had 
business interruption insurance at the time of the earthquake. This variable is a binary choice 
that equals 1 if the firm had business interruption insurance coverage at the time of the 
earthquake and 0 otherwise. Since all units in this study had property damage insurance (which 
includes insurance coverage for furniture, fixture, fitting, contents, equipment, and machinery 
breakdown), this variable captures the impact of business interruption insurance.  
Business interruption insurance (BI) covers loss of revenue and/or increased cost of 
working following a damage to the insured property. The claim payout from BI is mainly 
expected to lower the adverse impact of the loss of revenue. The increased cost of working 
coverage provides support for increased expenditures such as hiring temporary stuff, and 
renting a temporary warehouse and office spaces. Note that the coverage for increased cost of 
working is an add-on option with additional premium. We are not able to identify which type of 
BI coverage is available for each firm. 
The second core variable is whether the firm had received insurance payout over 80% 
and believe the amount of insurance coverage is adequate. This variable is a binary indicator 
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that equals 1 if the firm had received insurance payout over 80% and it believes the amount of 
insurance coverage is adequate and 0 otherwise. This variable exhibit the extent of supportive 
role of insurance in aiding recovery when the affected organization is adequately insured. 
In our dataset, there are some firms that have received insurance claim in full but the 
amount of coverage is deemed inadequate compared with the amount of loss they had 
experienced. Also, there are some firms that responded that they are adequately insured but it 
is not necessarily reliable because the claims have not yet been paid and we are not able to 
verify the adequacy of the amount covered. Under these circumstances, the role of insurance is 
not explicit because any positive effect to the affected firm in the aftermath of the earthquake 
would be due to other factors, not insurance, because the insurance claim has not been fully 
paid and/or the cover is not adequate. We, therefore, combine the adequacy of insurance and 
the proportion of claim payout into one variable to examine the role of insurance once the 
claim is adequately insured. 
8.1.3 Control Variables 
There are a total of 25 control variables in this study which can be categorized into five 
main categories. All the variables are hypothesized to have an impact on business recovery 
(Webb et al., 2002). The first category is industry sector. We use six binary variables to 
represent industry sectors: health care and social assistance, manufacturing, construction, 
accommodation and food services, financial and insurance services, and retail and wholesale 
trade. We include these as we hypothesize that different industry sectors would respond and 
recover differently after a natural disaster.  
We use four variables to represent ownership structure: sole proprietorship, 
partnership organizations, private limited liability company, and public limited liability 
company. Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment of New Zealand (2014) defines four 
types of business ownership structure in New Zealand: Sole traders, Partnerships, Companies, 
and others. We use two dummy variables to capture the first two types. We separate 
“Companies” into two: privately held Limited Liability Company and publicly held Limited 
Liability Company. 
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The third category is the size of organizations measured by the number of employees:  
organizations with less than 10 employees, and more than 50 (the use of dummy variables to 
represent a single attribute requires that we subtract one dummy variable out; therefore, the 
dummy represents organizations that employ between 10 and 50 people are left out of the 
model). We have the precise number of employees of each firm but using dummy variables to 
represent the size of organizations allows us to better capture the effect of different 
organization’s size. The fourth category is the causes of disruption brought about by the 
earthquake. We have three variables capturing different causes of business disruption after the 
earthquake: whether the firm was disrupted by structural damage, by non-structural damage, 
and whether the firm had difficulties accessing their business premises (these are not mutually 
exclusive).  
We have three variables to capture the financial situation of each firm. The first is the 
proportion of the firm’s revenue coming from the Canterbury region prior to the earthquake. 
The firm which solely operates in Canterbury (i.e. earn 100% revenue from Canterbury) is more 
likely to suffer than the firm which diversified its business operations to several places. The 
second variable is whether the firm has high outstanding debt. The third variable is whether the 
firm finances its recovery by spending from its own sources: its cash flow (for company or 
partnership) or personal savings (for sole traders).  
In addition, two variables capture total number of locations of each firm classified, 
separately, into the total number of locations in Canterbury and the total number of locations 
in New Zealand (excluding Canterbury). If the affected firm had other locations to operate, they 
could quickly recover by moving from the Canterbury location to the other locations. 
Additionally, we have one continuous variable that captures the number of years that the firm 
had been operating prior to the earthquake; one variable that captures whether the 
organization is for-profit organization; and, one that captures whether the firm had emergency 
plans in place at the time of the earthquake.  
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8.1.4 Correlation 
Table 8.2  Correlation matrix of core variables and outcome variables 
Variables Adequately Insured Profitability Productivity Better-off 
BI .165** .085 .144** .070 
Adequately Insured  .081 -.011 .040 
Profitability   .218** .265** 
Productivity    .605** 
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
 
Table 8.2 shows the correlations of outcome variables and core variables. For the outcome 
variable, there is a correlation of 0.605 (0.05 significance) between whether the firm is 
positively impacted by the earthquake and increased productivity level, and a correlation of 
0.265 (0.05 significance) between whether the firm is positively impacted by the earthquake 
and firms’ profitability. Profitability and increased productivity also are positively correlated at 
0.218 (0.05 significance).  
For the core variables, business interruption insurance coverage is significantly correlated with 
productivity of 0.144 (0.05 significance). The claim adequacy is not significantly correlated with 
any outcome variables. The BI also positively correlated with insurance adequately of 0.165 at 
0.05 significance level.  
 
8.2 Empirical Results  
The regression of core variables without any control variables have 432 observations. However, 
there are some missing values as there were missing responses for some of the survey 
questions. Therefore, we were left with 416 observations for the regression when including the 
control variables. We discuss the sign of the coefficients of each core variable below. The 
average marginal effects of each core variable will be discussed in a separate section. 
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8.2.1 Results of Adopting Business Interruption Insurance 
As discussed earlier, the first core variable is whether the firm had adopted business 
interruption insurance at the time of the earthquake. Table 8.3 displays the results of the logit 
regression with White’s standard errors for each outcome variables. When regressing without 
any control variables, business interruption insurance seems to significantly affect profitability 
and productivity of firms. However, when adding control variables, the BI significantly 
(statistically) impacts the productivity level of firms and possibly leads firms to be better off 
after the earthquake.  
The overall model is fit at 0.01 significance level for all three outcome variables with 
pseudo r2 of 13.25%, 13.93%, and 13.97% for profitability, productivity, and the firm’s better off 
respectively.20 In contrast with productivity, business interruption insurance seems to have 
minimal impact on profitability. While we are not directly testing the various channels through 
which the presence of BI insurance can generate an increase in productivity, it may be because 
BI payouts provide additional funding for investment in productivity. Although the increase of 
productivity after the earthquake may depend on various factors such as the change in 
demand, our model does show that business interruption insurance (statistically) significantly  
leads to increased productivity. The result is robust with and without control variables with 
slight difference in the magnitude of the coefficients. For the third outcome variable, the result 
suggests that business interruption insurance significantly leads firms to be better off. 
In any case, the result suggests that the adopting business interruption insurance has a 
positive impact on all outcome variables. It significantly supports the increased productivity 
level and positively affect firms after the earthquake.  
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The pseudo r2 is also known as McFadden’s r2. It is defined as 𝑅2 =  1 − 
ln ?̂?(𝑀𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙)
ln ?̂?(𝑀𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡)
, where ?̂? is the estimated likelihood, 
𝑀𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 is model with predictors, and 𝑀𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  is model without predictors. Note that the pseudo r2 for logit regression is not 
interpreted as same as the r2 for OLS. The pseudo r2 is used to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of a model, however, it has no 
meaning when used independently or compared with different datasets. They are only useful when comparing multiple 
estimation models predicting the same outcome on the same dataset (Long & Freese, 2006). 
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Table 8.3  Logit regression results of adopting Business Interruption (BI) insurance 
Variables 
Profitability Productivity Better-off 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
No Control Variables  
BI 1 = had business interruption insurance 0.39 * 0.62 ** 0.31  
  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)  
 _cons 0.58 *** -0.43 ** -0.55 ** 
  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  
With Control Variables 
BI 1 = had business interruption insurance 0.20  0.76 ** 0.44 * 
  (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.25)  
 Industry Sector       
SHEA 1 = health care and social assistance -0.46  -0.27  -0.88 ** 
  (0.42)  (0.37)  (0.44)  
SMAN 1 = manufacturing -0.40  -0.66 * -0.83 ** 
  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.35)  
SCON 1 = construction 0.67  1.89 *** 1.22 ** 
  (0.47)  (0.43)  (0.42)  
SACC 1 = accommodation 0.36  1.17 ** 1.53 *** 
  (0.47)  (0.46)  (0.44)  
SFIN 1 = financial services and insurance 2.03 ** 0.19  -0.18  
  (0.88)  (0.52)  (0.54)  
SRW 1 = retail and wholesale trade 0.22  0.14  0.04  
  (0.33)  (0.3)  (0.3)  
 Ownership Structure       
OSOLE 1 = sole proprietorship 0.58  -0.15  0.06  
  (0.59)  (0.52)  (0.53)  
OPART 1 = partnership 0.67  0.35  -0.26  
  (0.64)  (0.6)  (0.61)  
OPRIV 1 = private limited liability company 0.20  0.61  0.27  
  (0.51)  (0.46)  (0.46)  
OPUB 1 = public limited liability company 1.79 * 0.03  -0.03  
  (1.01)  (0.73)  (0.75)  
 Size of Organization       
ELE10 1 = employ 10 employees or less -0.59 ** -0.40  -0.32  
  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.27)  
EGR50 1 = employ greater than 50 employees -0.43  -0.07  -0.62  
  (0.4)  (0.38)  (0.39)  
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Variables 
Profitability Productivity Better-off 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
 Level of Disruption by the EQ       
DSTRUC 1 = disrupted by structural damage -0.34  -0.02  0.05  
  (0.32)  (0.3)  (0.29)  
DNONST 1 = disrupted by non-structural damage  0.30  0.35  0.52  
  (0.3)  (0.28)  (0.28)  
DPREM 1 = difficulties accessing premises -0.62 ** -0.26  -0.32  
  (0.31)  (0.3)  (0.31)  
 Financial Status       
FREVC 
% revenue from Canterbury prior to the 
EQ 
-0.01  0.01  0.01 ** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
FDEBT 1 = currently have debt -1.92 *** -1.09 ** -1.21  
  (0.4)  (0.42)  (0.48)  
FOCF 
1 = finance its recovery with 
organizational cash flow  
0.01  -0.24  -0.43  
  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.25)  
LCANT 
current number of locations in 
Canterbury 
0.04  -0.08  -0.03  
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.03)  
LNZ 
current number of locations in New 
Zealand 
0.01  -0.01  0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
LCBD 1 = located in CBD 0.40  -0.21  0.08  
  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.25)  
NYR 
number of years operating before the 
EQ 
0.01  0.01  -0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
EMG 1 = had emergency plan in place k0.44  -0.19  -0.02  
  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.27)  
PROF 1 = for-profit organization 1.03 * 0.24  0.69  
  (0.63)  (0.54)  (0.57)  
OWN 1 = own the current property -0.23  -0.55 ** -0.20  
  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.24)  
_cons -0.15  -0.66  -1.63  
  (0.69)  (0.66)  (0.67)  
 
 Log pseudolikelihood -222.74299 -248.06692 -242.67464 
 Wald χ2 63.94 63.15 61.62 
 P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
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  Pseudo R2  0.1325 0.1393 0.1397 
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
Total observations for core-variable-only regression is 432 organizations. 
Total observations for regression with control variables is 416 organizations 
 
8.2.2 Results of Adequately Insured   
The second core variable is the adequacy of insurance. As we detailed earlier, we use 
the combination of whether the proportion of claim paid is over 80% and whether the insured 
consider the coverage adequate. Table 8.4 shows the logit regression results with White’s 
standard errors of each outcome variables. Without control variables, the core variable only 
significantly (statistically) affect the profitability of firms after the earthquake. However, when 
adding control variables, the core variable does not significantly affect any of the outcome 
variables. The adequate cover positively impacts the firm’s profitability and general 
performance while it has a slight negative impact on the increased in productivity level.  
 
Table 8.4  Logit regression results of adequately insured  
Variables 
Profitability Productivity Better-off 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
No Control Variables  
CADQ 
1 = claim payout over 80% and the 
coverage is adequate 
0.38 * -0.05  0.17  
  (0.23)  (0.2)  (0.21)  
 _cons 0.69 *** 0.01  -0.40 *** 
  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  
With Control Variables 
CADQ 
1 = claim payout over 80% and the 
coverage is adequate 
0.25  -0.10  0.16  
  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.24)  
 Industry Sector       
SHEA 1 = health care and social assistance -0.42  -0.18  -0.82 * 
  (0.42)  (0.38)  (0.44)  
SMAN 1 = manufacturing -0.39  -0.56  -0.79 ** 
  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.35)  
        
59 
 
Variables 
Profitability Productivity Better-off 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
SCON 1 = construction 0.67  1.71 *** 1.18 ** 
  (0.46)  (0.42)  (0.41)  
SACC 1 = accommodation 0.35  1.37 ** 1.58 *** 
  (0.46)  (0.47)  (0.44)  
SFIN 1 = financial services and insurance 2.00 ** 0.36  -0.13  
  (0.87)  (0.52)  (0.55)  
SRW 1 = retail and wholesale trade 0.26  0.21  0.09  
  (0.33)  (0.3)  (0.3)  
 Ownership Structure       
OSOLE 1 = sole proprietorship 0.58  -0.12  0.05  
  (0.59)  (0.55)  (0.55)  
OPART 1 = partnership 0.64  0.37  -0.28  
  (0.64)  (0.61)  (0.62)  
OPRIV 1 = private limited liability company 0.19  0.64  0.28  
  (0.51)  (0.49)  (0.47)  
OPUB 1 = public limited liability company 1.82 * -0.03  -0.03  
  (1.03)  (0.73)  (0.76)  
 Size of Organization       
ELE10 1 = employ 10 employees or less -0.57 ** -0.46 * -0.32  
  (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.27)  
EGR50 1 = employ greater than 50 employees -0.40  0.02  -0.58  
  (0.41)  (0.39)  (0.4)  
 Level of Disruption by the EQ       
DSTRUC 1 = disrupted by structural damage -0.33  -0.01  0.06  
  (0.32)  (0.3)  (0.29)  
DNONST 1 = disrupted by non-structural damage  0.29  0.37  0.51 * 
  (0.3)  (0.28)  (0.28)  
DPREM 1 = have difficulty accessing premises  -0.62 ** -0.31  -0.35  
  (0.31)  (0.3)  (0.31)  
 Financial Status       
FREVC 
% revenue from Canterbury prior to the 
EQ 
-0.01  0.01  0.01 ** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
FDEBT 1 = currently have debt -1.93 *** -1.08 ** -1.23 ** 
  (0.4)  (0.43)  (0.48)  
FOCF 
1 = finance recovery with organizational 
cash flow  
-0.02  -0.23  -0.44 * 
  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.25)  
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Variables 
Profitability Productivity Better-off 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
LCANT 
current number of locations in 
Canterbury 
0.04  -0.07  -0.03  
  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.03)  
LNZ 
current number of locations in New 
Zealand 
0.01  -0.01  0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
LCBD 1 = located in CBD 0.40  -0.16  0.10  
  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.25)  
NYR 
number of years operating before the 
EQ 
0.01  0.01  -0.01  
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
EMG 1 = had emergency plan in place 0.42  -0.13  -0.01  
  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.26)  
PROF 1 = for-profit organization 1.13 * 0.37  0.80  
  (0.62)  (0.56)  (0.58)  
OWN 1 = own the current property -0.24  -0.54 ** -0.20  
  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.24)  
_cons -0.20  -0.35  -1.51 ** 
  (0.7)  (0.64)  (0.66)  
 
 Log pseudolikelihood -222.57614 -252.77679 -243.98353 
 Wald χ2 61.32 58.21 60.20 
 P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
  Pseudo R2  0.1332 0.1230 0.1351 
Significance level 0.01***, 0.05**, 0.1* 
Total observations for core-variable-only regression is 432 organizations. 
Total observations for regression with control variables is 416 organizations 
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8.2.3 Marginal Effects 
Logit regression result cannot directly interpret the estimated coefficients as marginal 
effects. Table 8.5 displays the average marginal effects of the core variables on the outcome 
variables. Business interruption insurance has an average marginal effect of 3.5 (8.11) with 
(without) control variables on profitability. The result is significant without control variables. 
This means that having business interruption insurance, holding other things equal, increases 
the probability of being profitable by 8.11 percentage point.  
 
Table 8.5  Average marginal effects of core variables 
Variables Profitability Productivity Better-off 
Adopting business interruption insurance        
- No Control Variables 0.0811 * 0.1513 ** 0.0734  
- With Control Variables 0.0350  0.1558 *** 0.0860 * 
Adequately insured        
- No Control Variables 0.0782 * -0.0111  0.0401  
- With Control Variables 0.0438  -0.0201  0.0317  
 
Regarding the increased productivity of firms, business interruption insurance has a significant 
impact on productivity. It has an average marginal effect of around 0.15 both with and without 
control variables. When a firm adopted business interruption insurance, it has increased 
probability of increasing its productivity level by 15 percentage point. This results show robust 
estimation for the effect of adopting business interruption insurance on increased productivity 
level of firms in the aftermath of the earthquake.  
Regarding whether firms are subjectively better-off, business interruption insurance 
shows significant result when estimated with control variables. It has an average marginal 
effect of 0.086. The average marginal effects with and without control variables are slightly 
different. On average, a firm that has adopted business interruption insurance, has higher 
probability of being better off after the earthquake by approximately 8.6 percentage point 
higher, holding other things constant. 
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The insurance adequacy significantly increase the probability of firm’s profitability in the 
aftermath when regressing without control variables but the result is not significant when 
adding additional covariates. It has an average marginal effect of 0.0782 which means that 
being adequately insured increases the probability of profitable by 7.82 percentage point, 
holding other thing constant. 
In addition, insurance adequacy seems to increase the probability of being better off in 
the aftermath; though none of the results is statistically significant. Contrastingly, the marginal 
effect of being adequately insured on increased productivity level is counter-intuitive; it has a 
marginal effect of -0.011 (-0.02) with (without) controls. Insurance adequacy decreases the 
probability of increasing productivity level by 1 to 2 percentage point.  
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
We examine the role of insurance in business recovery following the Christchurch earthquake in 
2011 in the short- and longer-term. The central question we pose, in the short-term analysis, is 
whether insurance increases the likelihood of business survival in the aftermath of a disaster. 
We found only weak evidence that those firms that had both property damage and business 
interruption had  higher likelihood of survival post-quake. Whether this failure to find more 
robust evidence of insurance impact is an attribute of our data, or of problems in the way the 
sector operated in the immediate aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake remains an open 
question. For longer-term analysis, our results show a more explicit role for insurance in the 
aftermath of the disaster. Firms with business interruption insurance have higher probability of 
increasing productivity and improved performance following the catastrophe. Business 
interruption insurance significantly increase the likelihood of enhanced productivity – by 
approximately 15 percentage points. The BI claim undoubtedly supports business recovery in 
term of productivity and has positive impact on firm’s operation.  
As the first paper attempting to find a causal effect of insurance on business recovery, 
we emphasize some caveats. First, we would have preferred to have data on the actual 
property damage claims and the amount of business interruption claims each firm had (and 
relative to each firm’s size and revenue). In addition, an issue of major concern in the case of 
the Christchurch was, and still is, the length of time it took insurance firms to settle their 
clients’ claims. Knowing if and when the claims were settled would have allowed us to analyze 
more deeply the role of insurance in business recovery and further understand how the timing 
of payments may (or may not) facilitate business recovery. Had we had the actual break-down 
of BI claims, into loss of revenue and increased cost of working, we would have been able to 
further provide details on the precise role of business interruption insurance in determining 
firm performance. 
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Appendices 
Table 1  Descriptive statistics of total number of employees 
Description 
Insured Uninsured 
Mean (Std.Dev.) 
Min-
Max 
Mean (Std.Dev.) 
Min-
Max 
All employees 56.42 (154.04) 0 - 1200 60.71 (178.08) 0 - 1000 
Full-time 45.48 (139.29) 0 - 1200 53.59 (176.09) 0 - 1000 
Part-time 8.22 (25.19) 0 - 170 6.27 (18.24) 0 - 90 
Temporary staff 2.73 (24.48) 0 - 252 0.86 (2.25) 0 - 10 
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Figure 1  Histogram of estimated propensity scores, before (up) & after (down) stratification 
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